The purpose of this paper is to study the specificity and dynamics of governance culture in the Mediterranean Arab countries. We rely on the notion of governance developed by Meisel and Oueld Aoudia (2007) "Governance for Development" and we use the "Institutional Profiles" database for the years 2001-2006 and 2009. We accomplish a principal component analysis and we show that the institutions of governance prevailing in the Mediterranean Arab countries are not institutionalized and are dominated by interpersonal and informal arrangements. They are also characterized by low capacity of their States to coordinate private interests within the meaning of the general interest.
governance without government, that is to say a system of norms made by the agreement of the majority, which would thus achieving collective project without formal authority and concrete sanction governments". In addition, Rhodes (1996) defines governance as minimal State and a set of self-organized social networks. In this sense, governance can be seen as another name of the minimal State,"a process by which people resolves conflicts and achieve a cooperative solution" (Bsaies, 2006) . The World Bank (2003) defines governance as "the exercise of authority in the name of the people", which means the need to involve citizens on an equal basis in the governance process (principle of inclusive) and that they are able to hold their government accountable for the way it makes use of State authority and resources of the people (principle of accountability). In addition, Kaufman and Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) argue that governance refers to "the traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised for the overall property, including the process by which the authorities are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them". For international financial institutions, the role of the State is to ensure the proper functioning of the market economy, that is to say to provide a favorable environment for private investment by reducing production costs, guaranteeing property rights, ensuring political stability and facilitating institutional arrangements. Good governance, where individual rights are respected, secure contracts, effective administration and democratic political institutions, is a universal solution to generate the confidence to begin the process of economic development. It is asked to transition and developing countries to adopt this tool for the development process begin. In their political of economic development cooperation, international donors will need to use their aid as an incentive to the reorganization or reorientation of policies and institutions in recipient countries. Good governance also appears as the guarantor of aid effectiveness for most donors, who believe that the failures of structural adjustment program in many developing countries are due to a deficiency of policy and institutional structures and to an inefficient public management, which is considered as a cause of wasteful of resources and a conversion of public institutions to a narrow circle of loyal and distribution of privileges and private benefits. This public governance is inefficient and it is necessary to substitute it by better governance (Good Governance). But more than a decade, after the forced invitation to them to comply was made, can we say that developing countries have adapted to good governance and the constraints arising from the globalization could undermine the system of governance which organized functioning of these countries and granted to their states a central decision-making power? In other words, is good governance a Good Development Strategy? More fundamentally, can we consider good governance as a-historical and universal necessity in any development strategy regardless of the specifics of the countries concerned?
Critique of the Concept of "Good Governance"
Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2007) show that, if good governance is certainly a powerful factor of confidence in developed countries, it can't produce confidence for all countries independently of their resources, their stories and their dynamics. The authors note a number of constraints faced by developing economies to build the institutions of good governance.
First, a mode of governance based on formal rules involves high fixed costs of investment in legal and judicial infrastructure and organization of monitoring and control. However, in most developing countries, the financial resources are often limited. Furthermore, these organizations must themselves be sufficiently ruled over a sufficiently long period to win the trust of investors. Given the financial, human and temporal constraints they face, the majority of developing countries do not afford this investment in the short or medium term. Then, the formalization of rules is long and complex. Institutional transition, the transition from an informal institutional status to a more formalized institutional state requires to go through phases of uncertainty where the old rules may no longer work, such as loyalty, respect for speech and traditional solidarity while the new rules based on the law and written agreements are not established in the heart of society. The erosion of the traditional system of social regulation leads to a loss of informal safety without any gain in the field of formal security (institutional). Countries cannot advance in this work and get stuck at the threshold of institutional transition.
In addition, the institutions of good governance have been strong resistance from the political and economic elites. In developing countries, most of the recommendations emphasize the importance of having governance institutions supporting the market. It is therefore formal rules where the mode of production of trust, power and information is systemic, conferring rights, including property rights, to all on written and enforceable bases. However, by its formal and universal character, this requirement is the germ of social destabilization and directly threatens the privileges of proponents of social order, the economic and political elites, which derive their power specially from their exclusive access to security of rights and resources. The resistance of interest groups is therefore presented as a blocking factor of institutions. In this regard, North et al. (2007) argue that the study of the process of institutional change must be understood in terms of transition of the closed social orders towards opened social orders. The survival and sustainability of the dominant coalition depends on its ability to block access to these new social actors that they could jeopardize their privileges.
Finally, the institutions of good governance cannot explain the performance of some developing countries. Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2007) show that the economic boom experienced by these countries has no direct relationship with the "Good Governance". Countries that share the same level of "bad governance" may have completely opposing economic performance; some have experienced high growth assured them off and the other on the contrary remained trapped in systems of very low growth. The examples of China, Vietnam, Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia, on the one hand, and those of Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Côte d'Ivoire and Venezuela, on the other hand, are these points of view edifying (Note 3). Furthermore, the authors found no significant correlation between foreign direct investment in developing countries and each component of good governance. So that, contrary to the "common wisdom", "Good Governance" is not a major criterion for location decisions of international investors. Countries characterized by low performance in terms of governance receive higher investment flows, while countries with good performance in governance receive little FDI. In addition to traditional factors attracting FDI, the main factor in their attractiveness is the willingness of insiders, political and economic elites in recipient country, to allow or not the entry of newplayer in the market. Insiders oppose the entry of FDI, such as the disregard of property rights and other institutional interlocks, if they perceive the arrival of FDI as a threat to their rent position. By cons, facilities and advantages shall be granted if they have a personal or common interest following their entry.
Therefore, "Good Governance" proposed by the World Bank, cannot be an effective and universal solution for any development program, dice when we adopt a new and expanded concept of governance proposed by Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2007) .
To a Broader Concept of Governance
Meiselet al. (2007) have proposed a new and broader governance "governance for development", which takes into account both concept: (i) different institutional arrangements (Note 4) that produce trust between agents, between agents and organizations (State, enterprises) through arrangements taking into account the level of development of each country (governance focal monopoly, formal rules) and (ii) the political economy of systems of social regulation (the opening of system insiders) (Note 5). Based on this broader concept of governance, we assume the existence of several production factors of trust, which vary depending on the level of income and the economic, political and social context of the considered economy. For each factor of production of trust corresponds a system (or similar systems) of governance. This broader notion of governance "Governance for Development", presupposes that economic development is a multidimensional phenomenon where economic and political factors are interdependent in terms of their effects on society. The transition from poor to rich countries implies radical changes, deep ruptures, causing strong resistance whose outcome is uncertain. Economic policy analysis allows us to understand this type of behavior adopted by the ruling coalition. It designs the decisions and actions of the state as the resulting exchanges made on the "political market" involving different actors (voters, interest groups, politicians and bureaucrats).
Therefore, it is more convenient to expand our traditional view of national systems of governance rather than trying to understand the multitude of existing institutional profiles among developing countries through the single prism of criteria derived from Anglo-Saxon experience. It is possible for each developing country to build its own institutional development model. Governance systems should be understood in terms of their ability to produce "trust" and information (Note 6). Production factors of trust vary by income level and by economic, political and social context of the considered economy. At each trust production factor corresponds a system (or homologous systems) of governance. Meisel (2004 Meisel ( , 2005 distinguishes different institutional systems whose identification depends on how trust, power and information are produced, allocated and exchanged between different individuals. The author suggests that the production of trust depends on:
National System of Governance
(i) the degree of formalization of the rules governing the economic, political and social activities. We can then distinguish the systems of governance where the production of trust, power and information is systematic and is based on formal rules and others characterized instead by informal rules and an interpersonal mode of production of trust. so that they also serve the interests of the national community. The existence of adequate instances of deliberation, consultation and coordination permit identification of the "common interest" and its realization. "The role of governance institutions is then to ensure that the field of social interactions is not reducible to a simple game of power relation between different individuals, but allows continually to a common interest to emerged and to be realized" (Meisel, 2005) We can then distinguish governance systems characterized by a high degree of focus or coordination of private interests in order to achieve a collective interest and others instead characterized by a low degree of coordination and the existence of a multiplicity of focal governance. Four types of national systems of governance can be distinguished:
• Governance systems based on formal and impersonal rules. In such systems, the formalization of rules is an important tool for the production of trust between individuals. These rules apply to all and ignored the intrinsic characteristics of each individual, which ensures a high level of confidence in their respect and enforcement. This method of producing confidence characterizes developed countries that have experienced a long process of depersonalization of social relations and formalization of rules. Production of trust can be described by systemic.
• The governance systems based on personal relationships: In such systems, the trust in the relationship to power, in the flow of information and in the rules are made and shared according to the specific characteristics of individuals or their belonging to a group (family, ethnic) of limited size by definition. Such a system characterizes many developing countries in the years 1950-1960, which were early in their industrialization process. Nevertheless, as the population grew and the economy is opened and integrated with the regional and global economy, traditional production system of trust has become unsustainable. Using a system of depersonalization of social, economic and political regulations became inevitable. Indeed, local actors are engaged in commercial and financial transactions with foreign players, who are accustomed to systems based on formal rules, where high levels of trust and information produced by the system itself.
• The systems of governance based on the existence of a governance focal monopoly. These types of organization are based on the existence of a state that has the ability, with varying degrees, to coordinate, the relationships between interest groups prevailing at different levels of society, at international, national and local levels in order to exceed oligopolistic struggle between these groups for access to rents and achieve the highest possible common interest. The power of a governance focal monopoly depends on its ability to coordinate the interests and influence the private logic of special interest coalitions in the direction of the general interest in the long term, so that stakeholders are not only interested in what think or what is going to do the other (pure strategic rivalry), but they think about a stable and unique solution can be established. If the focal monopoly is powerful enough, it can ensure that the public interest is taken into account by each of the interest groups even in developing its strategy.
Hence it changes the structure of incentives and information in games of particular interests, so as a result that interest groups serve a much wider interest than their own. Therefore it acts directly on growth by reducing transaction costs and ensuring security expectations for agents.
Several historical experiences illustrate the operation of governance focal monopoly. South Korea has realized its economic takeoff during the period 1960-1990 with a strong coordinator and anticipatory State. The France of the "thirty glorious years" also had a highly coordinator-anticipatory State, allowing it to provide very high economic performance since the end of World War II until the early 1970s. Furthermore, the majority of the reforms in China have produced good results from1978 thanks to special attention paid by the government to the interests of different social actors involved in the reform processand, in particular, interest groups individuals.
• The governance systems based on crony capitalism.
This system corresponds to a situation where the political and economic elites are strongly linked. Such a system characterizes economies that are vulnerable to political instability phenomena due to conflicts between coalitions of special interests, so that the option of focal monopoly, of coordination and institutionalized dialogue seem to deviate. For these countries, a system based primarily on the "cronyism", offers a solution much cheaper and easier to implement. The solution is to involve government officials or their relatives to the income produced by the asset owners in the exploitation of resources. Political and administrative elites accordingly provide a "broadly inclusive" interest (encompassing) in the rents generated by the economy.
It should be noted that such a system of governance characterizes the majority of developing economies. It is a priori an inexpensive solution and seemingly beneficial to economic growth but it has serious limitations. In order to establish legitimacy of political leaders, such a system of governance can initiate or ensure the growth of some macroeconomic aggregates (such as increased investment or gross domestic product) but does not guarantee www.ccsenet.org/ijef International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 6, No. 5; 2014 economic development or sustainability of this growth over a long period. In this regard Ouel Aoudia (2006), Souissi (2013 Souissi ( , 2014 show thata system of governance characterized by a strong collusion between economic and political elites is an obstacle to their economic takeoff and their convergence to advanced economies. Furthermore, Benali (2004 ), Diallman (2001 ), El Morched (2008 , Catusse (2009 ), Gobe (2007 show that during the implementation of reforms, the political class in most developing countries day to prevent the risk of a strong opposition. Its main objective is the search for greater legitimacy ensuring their continued power. For this, it develops clientelistpoliciesand distributesprivilegesand benefits. More stakeholders and interest groups claim, the more they threaten the détenants of political power and the more they get privileges. In this sense, works are multiplied onthe formation ofcoalitionsbetweenpolitical and economic elitesand the emergenceof winners andlosersofadjustment policies.
The Specificities of National Systems of Governance in the Mediterranean Arab Countries: A Principal Components Analysis
The principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical instrument that is used to extract the information in a database consisting of a set of individuals, characterized by a high number of variables roughly correlated.
It offers a representation of individuals on factorial designs with two dimensions (only representable). The axes are in fact built on the basis of linear combinations of variables and variance of all observations. They are classified according to the level of variance of the point cloud that it can focus. The first axis is the one that captures the most variance of the point cloud formed by the set of variables, then the second, etc. The interpretation of the first two axes is crucial in the factor analysis. It is done mainly on the basis of the identification of variables that contribute most to the definition of the axes in question. By this method we try to locate countries on a factorial design to identify governance systems characterized by all countries reviewed, in particular the Mediterranean Arab countries.
This work is inspired from Meisel (2004) , whose theoretical assumptions have not yet been empirically verified.
The author suggests the existence of a multiplicity of cultures of governance, every culture is characterized by the way that the trust, the power and information are produced, organized and shared.
We consider the two modes of production of confidence indicated above:
-The formalization of the system of social regulation and -The governance focal monopoly. Meisel and Oueld Aoudia (2007, p. 43 ) have proposed two sets of indicators that reflect these institutional aspects.
Concerning the indicators of formalization of the system of social regulation, the variables are: (1) the effectiveness of the public administration, (2) control of corruption, (3) the security of formal property rights, (4) security transactions on the markets for goods and services and financial markets, (5) the security of rights and property transactions, (6) institutional solidarity, (7) the regulation of the financial system, (8) compliance labor law. Regarding the indicators of coordination and anticipation, we consider the following variables: (1) the ability of the state to facilitate forms of collaboration to emerge a common interest, (2) the capacity for autonomous decision of the State (3) the priorities of elite development, (4) coordination within and between governments, (5) the ability of political authorities, (6) the authorities' strategic vision, (7) the ability of the company for Innovation, -The test of sphericity of Barlett (Table1 below) shows a significant absence of spherical model. In fact, if the model is spherical, we can assume that the correlations between the variables areclose to zero and thusthere isno incentive to replace the variables with the components.The observed value must be less thanor equal to 0.05. In our case, the meaning is equal to 0.000, which means that the hypothesis H0 is rejected, that is to say that there's a significant lack of sphericity and we can therefore continue to study the principal components of governance.
In addition, the test Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO), which is a generalized measure of the partial correlation between the study variables, shows that the principal components factor analysis of governance systems is of high validity (with a measure equal to 0.899) (Note 8). Sig. ,000
Note. Survey 2001.
- Table B1 of Appendix B shows the most important components (or factors) according to their degree of inertia.
There are so many factors as variables. Only those components with eigenvalues greater than 1 are selected (there are 6 components) (Note 9). In our factorial design, we retain the first two factors, those which concentrate the maximum amount of information contained in our database; it is 51.894% for the first factor and 7.642% for the second factor.
- Table B2 of Appendix B provides the matrix components after rotation (Note 10). There are coefficients of different variables with respect to each component. The variables that contribute to the formation of a factor are those that have the highest coefficients of this factor. In fact each variable can be presented by the following expression:
With, a ij = the coefficient of the variable i associated with factor j; N= Number of factors.
The variable Xi will be captured by the factor whose coefficient is the highest. Moreover, it is noted that the sum of the square of the coefficientsaij, ie
2 , gives the weight of the variable i or the part of the variance explained by the n factors.
, represents the hand of the variance of the variable i sensed by the factor j. Factor j captures the variables having the highest information on this axis.
Given that the factor F j may be presented by the following expression:
With w ji =the coefficient of the variable I associated with the factor j. p= the number of variables.
The weight of the factor j or the variance of the factor j is given by the sum of the square of the coefficients of the factor
2 . Variance of factor j relative to the sum of the variance of the three factors gives the degree of inertia or the part of the variance of each factor; it is 51.894% for the first factor and 7.642% for the second factor.
We consider the Table 2 below, which takes account of variables in the database that have contributed to the formation of the first two axes. We distinguish two families of variables, those who have the highest correlation coefficients with respect to the axis 1 and those with the highest correlation coefficients with respect to axis2. We note that the variables A3020, A3021, A3041, A3043, A6010, A6011, A6012 and A6013 are among all variables in the database, those who have the most weight in the formation of axis 1 and variable A5110, A5150, B5000 and B5001 those who have the most weight in the formation of axis2. Variables that have contributed to the formation of the first axis reflect:
-The corruption that is apprehended by the A3020 and A3021 indicators;
-The efficacy of public policy and in particular the efficacy of fiscal systems, captured by variables A3041 and A3043;
-Security of formal properties rights seized by the variables A6010, A6011, A6012 and A6013;
In addition, variables that have contributed to the formation of the second axis take into account:
-The ability of the society to adaptation and innovation, captured by the variable A 5110;
-The investment in the future of the people, apprehended by the variable A5150;
-The technological environment and the diffusion of technology, captured by the variables B5000 and B5001.
The family of indicators having contributed to the construction of the first factor defines the degree of personalization in the functioning of governance institutions and those who contributed to the construction of the second factor define the level of coordination and anticipation (Note 11).
The first factorial plane derived from the principal component analysis and applied to 55 countries of the survey of MINEFE of 2001, is shown in Figure 1 below. This plan isbuilt from thefirst twoaxesof dispersion of variables revealed (Note 12).
-The first axis (vertical) that captures the most information contained in our base (i.e., 51.894 % of the total information) opposed two types of governance culture, namely the degree of "personalization versus depersonalization" in the functioning of governance institutions. This axis then discriminates between countries according to their degree of formalization of institutions. To the north of this axis, there are situated countries having governance systems characterized by highly formalized rules ie written and enforceable rules. Also, they are endowed with systems that ensure a high compliance with these rules: an efficacious and transparent administration, a security of transactions and property rights. On the south of this axis, focus systems marked mainly by informal links trust where formal control mechanisms are limited or poorly respected. The United States today can be located relatively on the high (north) of this axis because of their high level of formal regulation.
-The second axis (horizontal) captures 7.642% of the total variance and reflects the degree of "anarchy versus hierarchy" in the interaction of interests in a given country. To the left (west) are systems characterized by a multiplicity or a proliferation of potentially conflicting focal points of governance. The probability that any form of common interest emerge is low and the field of interaction of interests is likely to become a pure power game. Moving to the right (East), there are more hierarchical systems, characterized by a focal point of governance or a governance focal monopoly. In fact, Egypt is experiencing a degradation of its production of confidence and moves to the Southwest quadrant area, its system of social regulation has become essentially based on personal relationships. Similarly, Tunisia, in 2006 still located in the area south-east of framing but towards the southwestern quadrant and approximates the center. In 2009, it is located in the Southwest quadrant of the chart. So the existence of a government with the ability to coordinate actors and secure expectations is no longer the case in Tunisia. In fact, more the country is facing west, more the option of focal monopoly seems to recede and more it is exposed to political instability phenomena due to conflicts between coalitions of special interests. Morocco is still located in the northwest area of the graph but it approaches to the center. Its production of trust, based on formal and impersonal rules in 2001, is weakened. Algeria and Syria (the Libya in 2009) maintain their positions on the charts, compared to 2001. Their Governance systems are fundamentally based on personal relationships and are characterized by low capacity of States to coordinate private interests and to develop a strategic vision for the development and sharing beyond insiders.
So the formalization of rules cannot be an important lever for producing confidence in the Mediterranean Arab countries. Similarly, the existence of a government with the capacity to coordinate actors and secure expectations cannot be the case for these economies. In this case a "crony system" appears to be much less expensive and easier to implement, in short more realistic option (Note 13).
In summary, the results of our principal component analysis showed that the Arab Mediterranean countries are characterized by:
1) Governance institutions bit institutionalized and dominated by interpersonal and informal arrangements (with the exception of Lebanon).
2) A multiplicity of special interest coalitions and low capacity of states to coordinate private interests within the meaning of general interest.
3) The capitalism cronyism or the interweaving of public and private interests is a priori an inexpensive solution and not necessarily antagonistic to economic growth. Such a situation allows establishing legitimacy of political leaders. This legitimacy is ensured by a certain ability to initiate the development of the country or the achievement of high rates of economic growth (e.g., Tunisia and Morocco) (Note 14).
However, the predominance of closed social orders, held by economic and political elites is the basis of resistance to institutional reforms and the transition to market economy and democracy.
Conclusion
The wealth of institutional data base of MINEFE has allowed us to identify different systems of governance in a set of developing countries, transition and developed. This is an illustration or a concretization of the concept of national systems of governance, developed by Meisel (2004) . This database also allowed us to know the characteristics of the governance system prevailing in the Mediterranean Arab countries. The principal component analysis allowed us to identify the main discriminating factors, distinguishing countries by two dominant components: (i) the degree of formalization and depersonalization of governance systems on the one hand, and (ii) the degree of coordination of interests in favor of the public interest on the other hand. Location of different countries selected on the factorial design allowed us to identify different systems of governance. The Mediterranean Arab countries are among the countries that are still marked by the predominance of interpersonal arrangements and informal rules. They are marked by a low capacity for States to coordinate their individual interests or a multiplicity of focal points of governance. Except Lebanon, which converges to a governance focal monopoly in 2009, the other Mediterranean Arab Countries show a particularly strong governance deficit. We observe a quasi-absence of any mode of production of trust (formalized institutional system and governance focal monopoly). In these countries a "crony system" their appears a much less expensive and easier to implement, brief more realistic. However, the predominance of such a system is blocking the transition to market and democracy in the Mediterranean Arab countries. In this context, Nabli (2008) shows that the strong coalition between economic and political elites in Arab countries will block any institutional reform (progression of the rule of law) in these economies due to the resistance of the beneficiaries of the status quo and a self-sustaining imbrications of their public and private interests, on the one hand and a weak mobilization of the structure of social forces in these economies, on the other hand. Ben Abdelkader (2009) shows that the influence of the www.ccsenet.org/ijef
International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 6, No. 5; 2014 dominant clan of the sources of power in the Mediterranean Arab countries is strengthened and paralyzes any form of collective action. El Morched (2008) shows that Morocco for example has in recent years deep political and institutional restructuring to make favorable conditions to the emergence of a market economy, to clean up the political and social environment and establish the rules of good governance. The first result of these reforms reveals some important achievements, such as the strengthening of human rights, the modernization of the judicial system, broadening the scope of freedom of expression, the attempt to moralize public life and the introduction of multiparty politics. However, the weak capacity of expertise of the reformers, the lack of constructive debate and asymmetric information have given rise to a rent-seeking behavior and a dynamic trading between various social groups rent-seeking (the bourgeoisie affiliated with the ruling political class, bureaucrats, political parties).
The consequence of such a situation of institutional blockage is the accumulation of tensions through the society that could cause an episode of violent and brutal destabilization. The requests to participate of social and community organizations, when not satisfied adequately, become the origin of many conflicts. Current social movements in the Arab economies demonstrate such a conclusion. Their goal is to develop robust, transparent and responsible governance institutions, based on respect for the rule of law.
-0.49 and less = invalid; Note 9. In fact, most statistical software adopted for the selection of factors, the Kaiser criterion. This criterion retains factors whose explained variance (eigenvalue or inertia) is equal to or greater than 1. Components having a value less than 1 will be rejected. See on this subject G. FERGUSON (1971) , Statistical Analysis in Psychologie, New York, McGraw Hill, pp. 421-425.
Note 10. In fact, by construction, factors are orthogonal (so they are uncorrelated). Methods for orthogonal rotation (varimax) preserve the condition of orthogonality of factors.
Note 11. Recall that, each of these two families of indicators belongs to a larger family of indicators describing an institutional aspect, defined by Aoudia Ould and Meisel (2007) . These are the formalization of thesystemof social regulation and the coordination of private interests in favor of general interest.
Note 12. The application of the method of principal component analysis using the aggregated variables of data base offers the same results.
Note 13. However, it should be noted that the "cronyism" may appear in any culture of governance without becoming the dominant trait. In fact, a mode of production of formal and impersonal trust will be less exposed to the risk of spreading a culture of "cronyism" through the institutions of national governance.
Note 14. For other oil producing countries (such as Algeria or Syria) the establishment of a crony capitalism or partial redistribution of oil revenues (grants commodities in particular) provides some legitimacy to politicians without greater accountability from them (Ben Neffissa, 2002; Ben Abdelkader, 2009 ).
Appendix A Overview of the Contents of Selected Institutional Variables
We present below the MINEFI issues that led to the elementary variables, from which we have built our governance indicators survey. We expose it according to its institutional themes. Table A1 . Formalization of the system of social regulation Table A2 . Coordination-anticipation 
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